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Abstract
This study examines Qatari citizens’ attitudes toward migrant workers. While much research has been conducted on citi-
zens’ attitudes toward the abolition, tightening, or loosening of the Kafāla system in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries with regard to migrant workers’ residency rights, and on their contribution to the economic development of
these countries, little is known about how citizens’ religiosity and social engagement impact their acceptance of migrant
workers. In the present study, we address this question by examining the effects of religious and social capital on Qatari
citizens’ preferences for having Arab and Western migrant workers as neighbours, drawing on data from two nationally
representative surveys in Qatar. The results indicate that, even after controlling for a wide range of socio-demographic
attributes, social capital in terms of trust and bridging social ties has a strong effect on the Qatari nationals’ preferences.
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1. Introduction
The influence of migration on ethnic diversity and com-
munity cohesion has been extensively studied in the USA
and Europe. Scholars have generally found that large in-
flows of migrants change the demographic composition
of the receiving countries and have a strong and largely
negative impact on community cohesion. Consequently,
much of the discussion about migration is focused on
the mainstream population’s (or nationals’) attitudes to-
wards, and the socio-economic integration of, the mi-
grantworkers and their children. However, in the Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC) countries, surprisingly few stud-
ies have investigated these issues. In this context, the mi-
gration literature hasmostly been centred around under-
standing the recruitment of migrant workers, their lives
and working conditions in the host countries, their re-
mittances to family members back home, the impact of
remittances on the lives of their family members, and
economic development in the sending countries. It was
not until recently that the focus shifted slightly to an ex-
amination of the attitudes of nationals towards migrant
workers and the kafāla system which regulates their em-
ployment and residential status in the GCC countries. In
the GCC countries, ‘foreigners’ are guest workers who
have little prospect of becoming naturalized citizens of
the countries even though they may work and live along-
side nationals.
More than anywhere else in the world, the countries
of the Arabian Gulf are dependent on foreign labour to
sustain their economic growth and development. Across
the region, these workers play a vital role, carrying out
jobs that are both mundane (e.g. janitorial services, do-
mestic work) and critical to the national economy of
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these countries (e.g. construction, natural resource ex-
traction). Unlike in Europe, in the GCC generally, and in
Qatar and the UAE in particular, these ‘foreigners’ con-
stitute the majority of the population at the present
time. These workers also bring with them their vari-
ous religious traditions and customs, introducing signif-
icant diversity to countries for which Islam has long
been overwhelmingly dominant. The growing presence
of these workers has led GCC nationals to re-examine
their nationhood and their place within society. Accord-
ing to some critics, these demographic changes have led
some nationals to look inward, becoming more insular
and less engaged civically within their local communi-
ties and neighbourhoods. This may bemore pronounced
in Qatar with the commitment to the FIFA 2022 World
Cup. Such commitment has maintained or increased the
need for migrant workers in the country to complete the
infrastructure development projects but nationals’ atti-
tudes towards ‘foreigners’ have so far remained under-
researched.
In this context, we thought it high time that a system-
atic study be conducted which linked nationals’ religious
and social-civic engagement with their attitudes towards
migrant workers.We use Qatar as a case study because it
typifies Gulf countries, which have a very highly propor-
tion ofmigrant workers in the population (Ministry of De-
velopmental Planning and Statistics, 2016). The insight
from the study of nationals’ attitudes to and their pref-
erences for migrant workers as neighbours, a fairly inti-
mate form of personal interaction in the Qatari context,
has important implications both for the on-going debate
on immigration1 and social cohesion, and for the socio-
economic integration and well-being of immigrants. To
carry out the research, we have used two national rep-
resentative surveys that we conducted in Qatar. We find
that religious affiliation, social trust, and bridging social
ties play a significant role in citizens’ attitudes towards
migrant workers.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next sec-
tion, we give a review of the literature on social capi-
tal, social cohesion, and social trust. Based on this liter-
ature, we introduce our hypotheses, to be followed by
the presentation of our data and findings. We conclude
the paper with some discussions and suggestions for fu-
ture research.
2. Literature Review
Social capital is a complex and highly controversial con-
cept; nonetheless, it is widely used by scholars in various
social science disciplines as a measure of connectedness
at the individual, community, and national levels. Social
capital theorists use the term to refer to resources in-
herent in the social networks, whether such resources
are informational, material or psychological (Bourdieu,
1986; Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2001; Putnam, 2000). Such re-
sources could be beneficial to individuals in terms of chil-
dren’s education, job acquisition, career advancement,
health enhancement, and a range of other outcomes.
The benefits are not only for those in the networks, but
extend to people who are onlookers or who are not di-
rectly involved in the networks. Thus, social capital is
assumed to be helpful for community building too. Re-
searchers tend to differentiate between two types of so-
cial capital: bonding and bridging (Putnam, 2000). Bond-
ing refers to connections and networks within a homoge-
neous group, while bridging refers to social ties among
people with dissimilar characteristics such as race, eth-
nicity, education or personal attributes. As such, bridg-
ing is more related to the concept of social cohesion
(Cheong, Edwards, Goulbourne, & Solomos, 2007) and is
a point of interest for this analysis. A more comprehen-
sive definition of bridging social capital is offered by Put-
nam, who says that it ‘concerns voluntary associations
and horizontal ties based on common interests that tran-
scend heterogeneous differences of ethnicity, religion
and socio-economic status’ (2000, p.22).
Scholars have different views on how to assess the
relationship between social cohesion and social capital.
Putnam (2000) suggested that bridging social ties are a
means of ‘getting ahead’ in society, as opposed to bond-
ing social ties, which he describes as helping people to
‘get by’. The two forms of social capital tend to go hand
in hand although they might serve different purposes:
chicken soup for the sick and ‘sleeve-rolling’ for commu-
nity building. He holds that, in order to maintain and en-
hance community cohesion, people need to acquire con-
nections with members of other groups who may pos-
sess different types of social resources. However it is im-
portant to note, at this juncture, that as a political sci-
entist, Putnam’s main interest was in the effect of social
capital on social-political governance. Much of his anal-
ysis tends to link the state of democracy to the stock of
social capital in a society. For example, he attributes the
successful functioning of socio-economic life in northern
Italy to the high level of social capital in the region and
the opposite in the south, and different crime rates in the
different states of his own country to the different levels
of social capital in those states. In this regard, it would be
fair to say that he has paid insufficient attention to the so-
ciological causes of what he saw as the declining stock of
social capital, which has been examined by sociologists
investigating the determinants of bonding and bridging
social capital and concomitants such as trust in capital-
ist countries like the USA or Britain (e.g., Hall, 1999; Li,
Savage, & Pickles, 2003; Li, 2015; Paxton, 1999).
Sociological critiques of the relationship between so-
cial cohesion and social capital offer considerable in-
sights. Cheong et al. (2007), for example, argue that
more social capital does not necessarily lead to better so-
cial cohesion, as more social capital within groups tends
to erode connections with other groups. Thus, for these
authors, the ‘proposal to (re)create cohesive communi-
ties via social capital building may therefore be inter-
1 In the Qatari context, the term “immigrants” is used to refer to guest workers as there is no formal path to citizenship.
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preted as a diversion from the fundamental injustices’
(Cheong et al., 2007, p. 36). Leonard thinks that even
the transition from bonding to bridging social capital will
reinforce existing inequalities through the affirmation of
their existence and, therefore, ‘in order to set in motion
the framework for bridging social capital to emerge, the
conditions that led to the development of bonding social
capital need to be undermined’ (2004, p. 927). This view
is also echoed by Rajulton, Ravanera and Beaujot (2007),
who show that a strong sense of belonging can be as-
sociated with low tolerance of diversity. But Rajulton et
al. (2007) do not specify what kind of belonging leads to
low tolerance. In this paper, we argue and demonstrate
that personal belonging among family and kin is different
from neighbourhood belonging: the former may be asso-
ciated with low tolerance whereas the latter may foster
tolerance in the Qatari context.
The socio-economic insecurity of individuals and
communities has been found in numerous studies to
be the main influence behind weak and falling levels of
social capital and social cohesion (Fieldhouse & John-
son, 2008; Letki, 2008; Li et al., 2003). Viewed from this
perspective, social cohesion is best achieved by battling
poverty and correcting social injustice. A society that ac-
knowledges diversity while ensuring justice and prosper-
ity for all will more likely be a cohesive one. This, of
course, does not mean that social connections, social be-
longing or civic engagement play no role in social cohe-
sion. Beyond economic factors, we may find that bridg-
ing social ties and neighbourhood belonging have a posi-
tive effect on people’s attitudes or behaviour, especially
in societies such as Qatar where citizens account for only
a small proportion of the population.
Social cohesion is not unidimensional but encom-
passes different components such as trust and civic
participation. Trust between members of society is a
precondition for social cohesion. It would be difficult
to imagine a well-functioning society composed solely
or even predominantly of mutually distrusting and un-
connected individuals. Maintaining social cohesion for
ethno-culturally diverse societies is even more challeng-
ing when waves upon waves of immigrants from vari-
ous backgrounds, religious traditions, and group identi-
ties come to the country. In Qatar, the high level of seg-
regation between Qataris and out-groups offers a good
opportunity to study the relationship between social in-
teraction and intergroup cooperation.
A major issue in the conceptualization and measure-
ment of social cohesion concerns individual versus group
levels of social interaction (Friedkin, 2004). Individual-
level interaction refers to one’s willingness to remain
within one’s own social group and strengthen ties with it.
Group-level cohesion refers to the breadth and depth of
ties with out-groups. This is similar to the ‘bonding’ ver-
sus ‘bridging’ classification made by Putnam, but we can
make more refined distinctions. Individual-level cohe-
sion can be further differentiated into personal bonding
with family and kin, extended friendship ties with others
with similar or dissimilar characteristics, and meso-level
acquaintances with neighbours and others in the local
community. The effects of these connections on people’s
attitudes and tolerance may be different: close bond-
ing within family and kin may restrict people’s outlook
whereas friendship with others, particularly with people
of different ethnic backgrounds, may broaden people’s
horizons, as will a sense of community belonging that
bridges to out-groups. Almost all Qataris belong to the
same group in terms of racial and religious affiliation;
they are Arab Muslims. The traditional and conservative
nature of Qatari society and the constant influx of immi-
grants from non-Arab and non-Muslim backgroundsmay
lead Qatari nationals to ‘hunker down’, or become apa-
thetic or even antipathetic towards outsiders, but one
might also expect those with bridging ties or a greater
sense of neighbourhood belonging to be more open-
minded. To understand how social cohesion operates
in Qatar, we therefore need to understand how social
Qataris are and how their identification with in- and out-
groups might impact upon attitudes to out-groups.
The discussion of in-group versus out-group relations
is related to the differentiation mentioned above be-
tweenbonding andbridging forms of social capital. In our
context, bonding ties can be seen to reflect interaction
among Qataris or with the larger Arab groupings. Bridg-
ing concerns horizontal ties based on shared interests
that go beyond differences of race, religion, and socio-
economic characteristics. In a way, social cohesion can
be reached by realising the benefit of cross-community
relations: the more the different social groups in a so-
ciety work together, the higher the likelihood that all
groups will benefit. In Qatar, the realisation of national-
level social cohesion needs more bridging connections
across groups, namely, between Qataris and immigrants
who are different from them culturally.
Building strong bridging social capital is a way to
ensure that the benefits of bonding social capital be-
come society-wide rather than group specific. As Pieterse
(2003) says, for bonding social capital to yield positive
outcomes, bridging social ties need to be strong. Some
authors, such as Leonard (2004) and Rajulton et al.
(2007), also point to the potentially negative effects of
bonding ties on social cohesion through increased preju-
dice towards members of out-groups, which is likely to
develop when there are strong ties within tightly knit
communities (see also Portes & Landolt, 1996). In Qatari
society, there are many commonalities between Qataris,
as almost all of them are Muslims and Arabic speaking.
Also, most Qataris are tribally affiliated and therefore
strong group ties are apparent (Al-Kathim, 1991). Apart
from ethno-religious differences, immigrants in Qatar,
and especially non-Arabs, are also socially segregated
from Qataris through economic status, living conditions,
and cultural boundaries. This social setting encourages
each group to remain in their own spheres of life,which is
not conducive to inter-group interactions. Qataris share
strong ties amongst themselves due to tribal affiliations
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and a specific image that includes traditions and religion
as the core national identity. Yet, Qataris and immigrants
also share workplaces, neighbourhoods and even the ed-
ucation system, making inter-group tensions and associ-
ated problemsmore likely to occur. Therefore, it is of con-
siderable importance, in our context, to understand how
the strong intragroup ties among Qataris affect their at-
titudes to immigrant groups.
One of the key indicators of social cohesion is social
trust at the macro (generalized) and meso (situational)
levels (Li, Pickles, & Savage, 2005). Defining trust in the
Arab context is no easy task. As the Arabic proverb goes,
‘the most complicated of tasks is explaining that which is
in no need of explanation’. Trust is a word we frequently
use in our parlance and, more importantly, a practice
that we even take for granted in much of our social life,
a situation which is made possible through repeated so-
cial interactions.
Deutsch (1958) suggests that due to the expectation
of a positive outcome, the trusting party would be more
affected by betrayal of trust than affirmation of it. If you
trust someone, you have decided beforehand that the
outcome will be positive. If you are in doubt about the
positive outcome you don’t have trust. Trust is therefore
a relationship between two actors, the first extending
trust and the second receiving it (Baier, 1986; Hardin,
1993; Luhmann, 1980). This relationship centres on the
belief that the second party will react positively to trust
by delivering on the subject of trust in a material or sen-
timental manner.
The concept of trust explains why one would take
risks in dealing with others, participate in solving collec-
tive problems, or act in ways that seem to be in conflict
with the definition of self-interest (Levi & Stoker, 2000).
It has also been argued that it is sometimes in our own
interest to trust, as this enables us to gain access to ben-
efits that accrue whenwe deal with other people, lowers
the cost of everyday business, and fosters reciprocation
by others (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). Trust is mutually
beneficial when it is reciprocal, when the trusting and the
trusted parties act according to expectation. In highly di-
verse settings, the prospect of cross-group cooperation
may be hampered by differences and tensions between
groups. As earlier noted, the presence of trust presumes
a predisposition to cooperation and a relative absence
of tensions. For our study, this is the desired outcome, a
state of mutual predisposition to cooperate and work to-
gether between Qatari citizens and non-citizen residents
in Qatar.
It is therefore plausible to suggest that trust is a ratio-
nal choice whereby both parties can expect to gain from
the relationship. It is in the interest of the trusted party to
maintain the trustworthy status through delivering on ex-
pectation (Guth, Levati, & Ploner, 2008). When the trust
cycle is broken, both parties lose out. This is why social
trust is seen by researchers as being sociological rather
than psychological or purely economic (Lewis &Weigert,
1985). It is a result of social actions and repeated inter-
actions. In order to get by and get ahead in our personal
and social life, we need to work together and trust one
another (Arrow, 1972).
However, just as with many other social factors, trust
may have a downside. Bad, or so-called ‘blind’, trust is a
situation where the trusting party extends trust without
receiving the desired results from the trusted party be-
cause of the personal or ideological dispositions of the
latter. This bad trust could lead to manipulative political
and religious figures advancing their own agendas, which
could domuch damage to the social fabric. Arguably, vot-
ing for someone is partly a manifestation of trust that
the candidate will deliver on his or her promises. Many
Germans in the 1930s placed their trust in the Nazis and
their leader to solve the country’s economic, social and
political problems, but that trust led to a disaster for
the world.
Good trust is the focus of our study. By this, we
mean the kind of trust that encourages cooperation be-
tween members of different groups in society regard-
less of race, religion or nationality. Understanding what
trust exists between Qataris and migrant workers and
what factors affect it is the first step in advancing so-
cial cohesion. Good trust reaps the benefits of a coop-
erative society and avoids the dangers of prejudice and
non-cooperation.
Trust as ameasure in survey research has takenmany
forms. With regard to trusted parties, researchers iden-
tify three domains: trust in those we know, trust in insti-
tutions, and trust in undefined others. The first kind of
trust, sometimes called familial, particular or thick trust
(Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011; Field, 2008; Levi &
Stoker, 2000; Li, Heath, & Devine, 2015), is direct: the
trusted party is known and the relationship is easily ex-
plained. Repeated co-operation within the inner circle
provides an abundance of the information necessary for
people to decidewhether or not to trust someone (Stolle,
Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). The second kind of trust, re-
ferred to as trust in political institutions (legislative, exec-
utive, and administrative bodies), is also fairly stable as
such institutions have evolved over dozens or hundreds
of years. However, trust in the office-holders could vary
(Paxton, 1999). The final domain is commonly known as
generalised trust, namely, trust in others with whom one
has had no prior interaction. This concept is widely used
in social science literature. Stole defines it as ‘the poten-
tial readiness of citizens to cooperate with each other
and [the] abstract preparedness to engage in civic en-
deavours with each other’ (Stolle et al., 2008, p. 4).
Whilst some scholars regard generalised trust as in-
herently good, it is not without its critics. Arneil (2006),
for example, argues that while generalised trust might
function well in homogeneous societies, it is not as ef-
fective in ethnically diverse settings. This may be espe-
cially true in Qatar where the population is clearly di-
vided into Qataris, white-collar, and blue-collar migrant
workers, with racial and religious divides. Results from
the Social Capital survey in Qatar (2011) show that levels
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of generalised trust vary a great deal between the three
groups. Qataris exhibited the highest levels of trust while
blue-collar workers showed the least. This is intensified
by the high levels of in-group trust and the extremely low
levels of out-group trust.
The high level of trust shown by Qataris merits closer
scrutiny. As Wilson (n.d.) says, a respondent may often
be thinking of the intra-group relations when prompted
to assess his or her trust in unspecified ‘others’ and
therefore the answer may not accurately reflect the
level of inter-group trust in society. This was confirmed
by the fact that the level of generalised trust and of
Qataris’ trust in Qataris was similar but it dropped signif-
icantly when discussing out-groups (Al-Emadi, Diop, Le,
Al-Ansari, Jardina, Tessler, & Wittrock, 2011; Diop, Jar-
dina, Tessler, & Wittrock, 2016).
These considerations on personal trust focus on the
radius of trust, whereas the level of trust in the civic
sphere relates to the intensity of civic cooperation in a
society, which may or may not depend on personal ac-
quaintance between fellow members in civic organisa-
tions. By analysing indicators of in-group and out-group
trust, Delhey et al. (2011) conclude that it is possible to
control for radius of trust. Their results suggest that so-
cieties with more familial and tribal ties tend to have a
narrow radius of trust while more advanced societies ex-
hibit a wider radius.
As Qatari society is highly familial and tribal, the ex-
pectation is that the strong social divide betweenQataris
and immigrants will yield a narrow radius of generalised
trust that focuses on Qataris as a community rather
than extending trust to the overall, highly diverse soci-
ety. Qataris view themselves as ‘the’ group in society as
they are citizens of the country while all others are sim-
ply sojourners. Yet, as they live in proximity to these im-
migrants, their perception of the ‘general’ public is also
hampered by the way society is structured. For Qataris,
it is easier to view society in a segmented way: Qataris
and highly integratedArabs;white-collar non-Arabs,who
mostly interact with Qataris in the workplace and in ed-
ucational institutions; and blue-collar workers, who very
rarely have personal contact with Qataris (Diop, Le, John-
ston, & Ewers, 2016). Overlaid on this economic divide
are cultural differences, with much greater preference
shown for Arabs than for Westerners and Asians. Given
this, invoking particularised trust by asking Qataris about
their trust in specific out-groups, identified by their back-
ground, is better suited to our research questions.
Underlying particularised trust is the extent of con-
tact which a member of mainstream society has with
members of out-groups, as has been demonstrated by
much of the previous research (Forbes, 1997; Putnam,
2007; Schmid, Al Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014; Sigelman&
Welch, 1993; Stein, Post, & Rinden, 2000). In Qatar, con-
tact is of prime importance as different groups have dif-
ferent contact dynamics with Qataris. Arabs are more in-
tegrated, as they speak the same language asQataris and
share many social and cultural norms. Asians are usually
found in low-skilled jobs which don’t give themmany op-
portunities to have contact with Qatari nationals. West-
erners, on the other hand, share very little with Qataris
asmost of themdo not speak Arabic, do not live in Qatari
neighbourhoods, and their children do not attend public
schools. However, they are more likely than Asians to in-
teract with Qatari nationals in the workplace as they are
usually engaged in white-collar work. This social setting
requires a measurement of contact that acknowledges
these different dynamics.
Another factor in the Qatari context is related to re-
ligious affiliation. Religiosity and religious practice have
been found to have a significant impact on inter-group
trust (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Brambilla, Manzi, Re-
galia, & Verkuyten, 2013; Brenneman, 2008; Schmeets
& Te Riele, 2014; Schoenfeld, 1978; Traunmuller, 2011).
The religiously conservative nature of Qatari society en-
courages an exploration of the relationship between re-
ligion and trust as immigrant groups include both Mus-
lims and non-Muslims. However, religion is not the only
aspect of Qataris’ conservatism: social norms are also
highly important to Qataris.
Social conservatism and social attitudes in general
affect social trust, especially towards immigrants. Low
trust in members of other groups has been attributed
to strong adherence to group-specific norms (Dawes,
Van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1988; Uslaner & Conley, 2003).
The strong tribal nature of Qatari society elevates the
significance of social conservatism as social norms for
gaining an understanding of trust between Qataris and
immigrants. However, it is also important to note that
the increased presence of civic organisations and char-
ities may increase the likelihood of Qataris interacting
with immigrants in a new setting where more or less
equal status is apparent through volunteering and char-
itable work.
The ever-changing social (and political) milieu is also
important for understanding social trust. Immigration
is becoming an increasingly important political issue in
many parts of the world but, in the Qatari context, politi-
cal orientation is difficult to gauge, as no political parties
exist in the country. Nevertheless, the Arab Spring and
the resulting chaos in the region have had a notable im-
pact on all Arab countries and Qatar is no exception. Pro-
Islamist and anti-Islamist propaganda flooded Arab me-
dia and generated high levels of public interest in Qatar.
This allows us to test for the effects of Islamism mani-
fested as, for example, a desire for out-groups to adopt
Qatari customs.
The above discussions offer various ways in which
we could seek to understand social trust and social at-
titudes in Qatar. Many of the factors are, of course, in-
tertwined in the Qatari context. Understanding how reli-
gious, social, and political attitudes impact one another
is necessary in order to determine how significant these
effects are and which of them holds greater importance
in explaining trust in and attitudes to immigrants and so-
cial inclusion.
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3. Hypotheses
Based on the literature review, we have developed a
number of hypotheses in order to explain Qataris’ pref-
erences for having Arab and Western expatriate families
as next-door neighbours and the impact of religiosity, so-
cial capital, and civic engagement on these preferences.
For this purpose, we use separate models for each group
(Arab and Western families) and estimate a series of lo-
gistic regression models. For each subgroup, the base
model (Model 1) contains individual, household, and re-
gional characteristics as control variables, including gen-
der, marital status, education, age, employment, house-
hold income, region, and year of survey.
Model 2 introduces attitudinal and behavioural di-
mensions of religiosity. The former is self-reported re-
ligiosity. All respondents were asked to describe them-
selves as very religious, moderately religious, some-
what religious, or not religious at all. This variable is di-
chotomized with 1 indicating ‘very religious’ and 0 oth-
erwise. For the behavioural dimension of religiosity, re-
spondents were asked how often they go to a place of
worship, with answers ranging from daily, more than
once a week, once a week, once a month, more than
once a month, a few times a year, to seldom or never.
This variable is also dichotomized, with 1 for daily and
more than once a week, and 0 for the other responses.
Drawing on our discussions above, we can formulate our
hypotheses as follows.
Hypothesis 1.1: Religiosity is positively related to
preferences for having Arab families as next-door
neighbours, with greater religiosity associated with
stronger preferences.
Hypothesis 1.2: Religiosity is negatively related to
preferences for having Western families as next-door
neighbours, with higher religiosity associated with
weaker preferences.
The multitude of items discussed above can, following
Putnam (2000) and Li (2015), be grouped intowhatmight
be termed ‘core’ and ‘derived’ domains of social capital.
The former includes items such as social ties and relation-
ships constitutive of social networks per se and the latter
includes outcomes of being embedded in such networks
such as trust, preferences for assimilation and, for our
present purposes, preferences for neighbours. Based on
the two domains, we present the regression in the se-
quence which follows.2
The thirdmodel,Model 3, introduces elements of fam-
ily and friendship networks into the model. The family
network tests whether the family-inward orientation of
Qataris has a negative impact on their preferences for
next-door neighbours and the friendship network tests
whether the diversity of close friends is associated with a
positive impact on preferences for having Arab orWestern
families as next-door neighbours. With regards to family-
inward orientation, respondents were asked how often
they get together with family members including siblings
or extended kin for a social event or family occasion. Re-
sponses with ‘daily’ and ‘more than once a week’ frequen-
cies are coded as 1 and other responses as 0. As for friend-
ship networks, the variable is coded as 1 if respondents
have mixed friends, including Qataris, Arabs, Westerners
or friends living in other countries, and 0 otherwise.
Hypothesis 2.1: Family-inward orientation is asso-
ciated with weaker preferences for having Arab/
/Western families as next-door neighbours.
Hypothesis 2.2: Diversity of close personal friends
is associated with stronger preferences for having
Arab/Western families as next-door neighbours.
The fourth model,Model 4, introduces elements of civic
engagement and tests whether volunteering for civic or-
ganizations or donating to charities has a positive impact
onQataris’ preferences for having Arab andWestern fam-
ilies as next-door neighbours. Respondents were asked
whether they had volunteered to civic organizations and
whether they had donated to charities. Both questions
used the twelve-month period preceding data collection
as a time reference for each wave. The two variables are
also dichotomized with 1 indicating positive, and 0 nega-
tive, responses.
Hypothesis 3: A high degree of civic engagement
is associated with stronger preferences for having
Arab/Western families as next-door neighbours.
The fifthmodel,Model 5, tests whether generalised trust
in Arabs/Westerners is associated with Qataris’ prefer-
ences for having Arab or Western families as next-door
neighbours. Trust in Arabs and Westerners was rated on
a 0–10-point scale.
Hypothesis 4: Higher levels of trust in Arabs/West-
erners are associated with preferences for having
Arab/Western families as next-door neighbours, with
higher trust associated with stronger preferences.
Model 6 tests whether a desire for out-groups to adopt
Qatari customs has a strong impact on Qataris’ prefer-
ences for having Arab families as neighbours and a weak
impact on Qataris’ preferences for having Western fami-
lies as neighbours. All respondentswere asked to rate the
level of importance of out-groups adopting Qatari cus-
toms as part of the requirements for seeking citizenship
of Qatar. Responses for this question are coded as 1 for
very important and 0 for other responses.
Hypothesis 5.1: The importance Qataris attach to out-
groups adopting Qatari customs is associated with
2 We thank the anonymous reviewer who recommended this regression sequence.
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stronger preferences for having Arab families as next-
door neighbours.
Hypothesis 5.2: The importance Qataris attach to out-
groups adopting Qatari customs is associated with
weaker preferences for having Western families as
next-door neighbours.
Model 7 adds the respondents’ perception of neighbour-
hoodbelonging andModel 8 adds that of neighbourhood
cohesion. The belonging question is worded ‘I feel ac-
cepted as a member of this neighbourhood’ on a four-
point agree/disagree scale. This variable is dichotomized
as well, with 1 equalling ‘agree’ and 0 otherwise. The co-
hesion question in Model 8 asked respondents whether
they agreed or disagreed with the statement: ‘People
here look out for thewelfare of their own families and are
not much concerned with neighbourhood welfare.’ We
recoded the responses so that 1 means cohesive neigh-
bourhood, namely, that people in the neighbourhood
show concern for each other’s welfare, and 0 otherwise.
Hypothesis 6: A positive sense of neighbourhood
belonging is associated with stronger preferences
for having Arab/Western families as next-door
neighbours.
Hypothesis 7:A positive perception of neighbourhood
cohesion is associated with stronger preferences for
having Arab/Western families as next-door neigh-
bours.
4. Data and Results
Our analysis draws on data from the first two waves
of the survey ‘From Fareej to Metropolis: A Social Cap-
ital Survey of Qatar’ conducted by the SESRI at Qatar
University in 2011 and 2015 respectively. Both waves
were funded by the Qatar Foundation for Education, Sci-
ence and Community Development. The survey adopted
multi-stage stratified probability sampling and collected
information on representative samples of theQatari pop-
ulation focussing on three groups: Qatari citizens, high-
skilled migrant workers, and low-skilled migrant workers.
Overall, 4,821 interviews were completed between the
two waves (2,268 in the year 2011 and 2,553 in the year
2015) including a total of 1,631 Qatari nationals, 1,605
high-skilled workers, and 1,585 low-skilled migrant work-
ers. To explore the effects of social capital, religiosity,
and civic engagement on Qataris’ preferences for hav-
ing Arab or Western families as next-door neighbours,
we restricted our analysis to data on the Qatari citizen
sub-samples. The response rates were high (61% and
59% respectively). The data were weighted to account
for probability selection and non-response. The analy-
sis used in this paper is based on weighted data using
STATA (version 14), which takes into account the survey
design effect.
The survey asked a variety of questions on pref-
erences from which we selected two as our outcome
variables—preferences for having Arab andWestern fam-
ilies as next-door neighbours. More specifically, respon-
dents were asked whether they would have a ‘strong
preference, slight preference, neither a preference nor an
objection, slight objection, or strong objection for having
Arab families as their next-door neighbours.’ And they
were asked the same question about Western families.
The two variables are dichotomized—1 for strong pref-
erence, and 0 for the other response modes—and are
used as our dependent variables in this analysis using
logit models (further analysis using ordinal logit mod-
els yielded basically the same patterns). Our explanatory
variables are summarized in Table 1.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the vari-
ables listed in Table 1. Results from the substantive analy-
ses are presented in Tables 3 and 4with regard toQataris’
preferences for having Arab andWestern families as next-
door neighbours respectively. Data in the last two ta-
bles pertain to average marginal effects (AMEs) derived
from the logit models. While substantively the same, the
AMEs show the effects in terms of percentage points
rather than log odds as in logit models, offering easier
exposition. Overall, only one in four Qataris (25%) wish
to have Westerners as next-door neighbours, but over
twice as many (55%) are happy to have Arabs as next-
door neighbours.
Most empirical studies tend to explain findings in se-
quence. As our aim in this paper is to explain the socio-
cultural determinants of Qataris’ preferences for having
Arab andWestern expatriate families as next-door neigh-
bours as a dual dimension, it makes more sense to make
an exposition of the effects of our independent vari-
ables on the two groups simultaneously. We have also
conducted prior analyses on bivariate associations and
found that all our independent variables are significantly
associated with both kinds of preference (with the sole
exception of gender on preferences for Arabs). To save
space, we thus move directly to multivariate analyses as
shown in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.
With regard to individual and household characteris-
tics in the two tables, we can see that, in terms of net
effects, most variables in this domain (marital, employ-
ment and financial status, gender, age, education) do not
have notable effects: none of the variables are signifi-
cant with regard to preferences for Arabs in any of the
eight models in Table 3 (with the sole exception of richer
families unwilling to have Arab neighbours in Model 8);
and most of them have non-significant effects with re-
gard to preferences for Westerners (with the exception
of older and employed Qataris being less welcoming but
richer Qataris more receptive in the first four models).
With regard to regional differences, Qataris residing in
al Rayyan and other municipalities have stronger prefer-
ences for having Arab families as next-door neighbours
as compared to those residing in Doha (Table 3). As for
Western families, Qataris living in Al Rayyan are little dif-
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Table 1. Dimensions and indicators.
Dimensions Indicators
Demographic • Individual characteristics
• Household characteristics
• Year of survey
• Municipalities
Religiosity • Self-reported religiosity
• Frequency of going to places of worship
Trust • Trust in Arabs
• Trust in Westerners
Networks • Frequency of getting together with family members
• Diversity of close personal friends
Qatari Identity • Preferences of “adopting the customs of Qatar” for somebody seeking citizenship of Qatar
Civism • Volunteering for organizations over the past year
• Donating to charitable organizations over the past year
Neighbourhood belonging • Feeling of being accepted as a member of the neighbourhood
Neighbourhood cohesion • People in the neighbourhood only look out for their own welfare and are
(reverse-coding) • not concerned with neighbours’ welfare
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variables N Percentage
Male 1631 45%
Married 1631 71%
Employed 1630 49%
Household income ≥ 50, 000 QAR 1516 48%
Very religious 1629 18%
Daily attendance of place of worship 1624 43%
Getting together with family members on a daily basis 1619 74%
Diversity of friends (yes) 1631 62%
Qatari customs for immigrants (very important) 1603 61%
Volunteering (yes) 1626 22%
Charitable Donations (yes) 1601 76%
Neighbourhood belonging (yes) 1605 81%
Neighbourhood cohesion (yes) 1601 36%
Education
Vocational or less 461 30%
Secondary & post-secondary 598 36%
University degree, Masters, & Ph.D. 571 34%
Age
30 years or younger 452 28%
31–44 years 548 31%
45 years or older 585 41%
Municipality
Doha 540 34%
Al Rayyan 708 42%
Other municipalities 383 24%
N Min Max Mean
Trust in Arabs 1597 0 10 6.448
Trust in Westerners 1470 0 10 4.132
Social Inclusion, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 1, Pages 66–79 73
Table 3. Average marginal effects (AME) of Qataris’ preferences for having Arab families as next-door neighbours.
Variables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
Male –0.5 –3.2 –2.5 –2.8 –2.7 –1.6 –2.1 –1.1
Married –4.7 –4.5 –4.3 –5.0 –4.0 –4.3 –3.0 –3.3
Secondary –1.0 –0.8 –0.4 –0.2 –1.6 –1.2 –2.5 –2.1
Tertiary –3.1 –3.4 –2.6 –2.1 –0.2 –0.1 –0.2 –0.6
Aged 31–44 –1.2 –0.8 –0.9 –0.4 –0.5 –0.2 –1.0 –1.0
Aged 45+ –0.8 –1.5 –1.2 –0.9 –0.1 –0.4 –1.3 –0.1
Employed –2.0 –2.2 –2.1 –1.9 –2.0 –2.2 –2.1 –2.1
Household income ≥ 50,000QAR –3.8 –3.9 –3.4 –3.9 –3 –3.2 –4.3 –5.4 b
Living in Al Rayyan 16.6 c –7.5 b –7.5 b –7.2 b –7.1 b –7.6 b –7.0 b –7.6 b
Living in other areas 17.1 c –8.1 b –7.3 c –7.0 c –7.5 c –7.2 c –7.0 c –6.0
Year of survey (2015) 10.3 a –9.6 a –9.3 a –8.8 a –7.3 b –8.4 a –8.9 a –8.9 a
Religiosity –7.1 c –6.9 c –6.8 c –6.9 c –7.4 c –8.4 b –8.7 b
Religious attendance –3.3 –3.7 –4.0 –4.0 –2.6 –3.9 –3.0
Getting together with family and kin –2.5 –2.4 –2.8 –3.2 –4.6 –5.0
Diversity of friends –4.7 –4.8 –5.4 c –5.4 c 14.5 14.0
Volunteering –4.6 –4.3 –4.5 14.1 14.4
Donations –5.3 –4.4 –3.9 13.1 13.8
Trust in Arabs –3.1 a –2.9 a 12.8 a 12.8 a
Qatari customs for immigrants –8.3 a 17.7 b 17.6 b
Neighbourhood belonging 10.8 a 11.2 a
Neighbourhood cohesion 14.7
Wald χ2 23.35 28.57 30.15 35.38 58.78 69.38 75.09 82.44
McFadden’s Adj R2 0.014 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.038 0.043 0.049 0.054
N 1479 1471 1462 1441 1420 1402 1382 1367
Notes: a p< .01, b p< .05, c p< .10; Reference categories are female, non-married, with primary education, age under 30, non-employed,
household income ≤ 50,000 QAR, living in Doha, survey year 2011, less religious, with less bonding and bridging ties, less desirous of
foreigners adopting Qatari customs, less volunteering and donating, and less attached to the neighbourhood; 1 QAR = 0.27 US Dollar.
ferent from those living in Doha and only those living in
other municipalities show positive preferences for hav-
ing Westerners as next-door neighbours (Table 4). These
results suggest that Qataris residing in Doha are less keen
to have them as next-door neighbours.
With reference to the waves, the results show a posi-
tive and significant (at 0.1 level) effect for the year (2015)
variable in all models, indicating improved Qatari atti-
tudes towards Arab and Western families between 2011
and 2015. This pattern is in line with two major changes
that occurred during that period, namely, the awarding
of the FIFA 2022 World Cup and a 60 percent salary in-
crease for Qatari nationals. Though the announcement
of Qatar hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup was made in
December 2010, itwas around 2015 that outside scrutiny
and criticism of Qatar’s policies with respect to the treat-
ment and welfare of its guest workers reached a criti-
cal point and required a response. This in turn increased
awareness of migrant workers’ issues among Qatari na-
tionals. In addition, in 2011 the government increased
the salary of Qatari nationals by 60 per cent. Taken to-
gether, these two events may have contributed to the
change in nationals’ attitudes towards both Arab and
Western expatriate families. The national mood was hap-
pier and more welcoming of guest workers.
Turning to religiosity and religious attendance, we
find a weak and negative association with preferences
for having Arab or Western expatriate families as neigh-
bours, with religiosity effects barely significant (at 0.1
level) for Arabs, indicating that Qatari nationals who con-
sider themselves very religious are less likely to want
Arab families living next-door. This is an unexpected re-
sult as Qataris and most Arabs share the same language
and religion.
Family and friendship networks seem to play an im-
portant role. Family-inward orientation has no signifi-
cant (albeit weakly negative) bearing on the Arab mod-
els but, as might be expected, a strong and significantly
negative impact on Western expatriate families, indicat-
ing that strong bonds amongst family members tend to
make Qatari nationals more disinclined to accept West-
ern expatriate families as next-door neighbours. By con-
trast, we find in both tables that bridging social capital,
as indicated by a diversity of friendship networks, tends
to make Qataris more open and more willing to accept
both groups as next-door neighbours, and indeed, more
so for Westerners than for Arabs: around 10 percent-
age points for Westerners and 5 percentage points for
Arabs. Whereas the impact is significant in early models
(5 and 6) for Arabs, the effect becomes non-significant
with models 7 and 8. On the other hand, the effect is
fully significant for all models 4–8 with regard to West-
ern families. Further analysis shows that the net effects
of friendship diversity are significantly stronger for West-
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Table 4. Average marginal effects (AME) of Qataris’ preferences for having Western families as next-door neighbours.
Variables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
Male –0.4 –0.4 –0.5 –0.3 –0.4 –0.5 –1.1 –0.6
Married –0.5 –0.5 –0.8 –1.0 –0.5 –0.3 –1.2 –0.9
Secondary –4.1 –4.1 –3.4 –2.7 –1.4 –2.6 –1.7 –2.0
Tertiary –4.0 –4.0 –2.5 –2.1 –0.2 –1.5 –1.2 –1.2
Aged 31–44 –2.5 –2.5 –3.8 –3.6 –3.6 –3.5 –4.3 –3.3
Aged 45+ –6.5 c –6.2 –7.4 c –7.2 c –8.0 b –8.3 b –8.6 b –7.6 c
Employed –3.5 –3.5 –4.1 –3.9 –5.2 b –4.9 –4.4 –5.0
Household income ≥ 50,000QAR –4.8 c –5 c –5.7 b –5.8 b –4.1 –3.9 –3.7 –3.0
Living in Al Rayyan –1.7 –2.0 –3.0 –3.0 –3.6 –3.7 –3.4 –4.8
Living in other areas 11.5 a 11.9 a 10.5 a 10.0 a 11.7 a 11.4 a 11.6 a 10.1 a
Year of survey (2015) 11.4 a 11.1 a 10.8 a 10.6 a 18.8 a 19.9 a 10.1 a 19.6 a
Religiosity –3.0 –2.3 –2.7 –2.1 –2.2 –2.3 –2.1
Religious attendance –0.3 –0.7 –1.4 –1.6 –1.7 –3.5 –1.8
Getting together with family and kin –8.5 a –8.4 a –8.4 a –8.2 a –9.1 a –9.2 a
Diversity of friends 10.5 a 11.1 a 19.5 a 10.0 a 19.1 a 18.9 a
Volunteering 12.4 11.7 12.0 11.3 11.6
Donations 11.9 11.8 11.5 10.7 11.5
Trust in Westerners 12.9 a 12.8 a 12.8 a 12.8 a
Qatari customs for immigrants 14.0 13.1 13.0
Neighbourhood belonging 10.1 a 10.3 a
Neighbourhood cohesion 10.9 a
Wald χ2 37.92 38.02 59.72 62.02 93.49 95.56 101.76 112.58
McFadden’s Adj R2 0.031 0.032 0.050 0.051 0.087 0.091 0.097 0.110
N 1479 1471 1462 1441 1310 1295 1279 1267
Notes: a pv < .01, b p < .05, c p < .10; Reference categories are female, non-married, with primary education, age under 30, non-
employed, household income ≤ 50,000 QAR, living in Doha, survey year 2011, less religious, with less bonding and bridging ties, less
desirous of foreigners adopting Qatari customs, less volunteering and donating, and less attached to the neighbourhood; 1 QAR = 0.27
US Dollar.
erners than for Arabs across allmodels 3–8 (all significant
at 0.1 level), which demonstrates the powerful effects of
bridging social capital amongstQatari nationals on accep-
tance of Western expatriates.
Existing studies of social capital highlight the role of
a strong civil society through which individuals who ac-
tively participate in political and social life learn how to
work with others to solve collective problems and, in
the process, become more open-minded, tolerant, trust-
ing and trustworthy, and more welcoming to fellow cit-
izens and people from other countries (Diop, Jardina,
et al., 2016; Jamal, 2006; Li & Marsh, 2008; Li, Savage,
& Warde, 2008; Putnam, 2000). Given this, we might
expect Qataris who volunteer and/or donate to char-
ity and other organizations to exhibit stronger prefer-
ences for having Arab and Western families as next-door
neighbours. However, as can be seen from the results
(Model 4), volunteering and donations to charity play no
significant role in this regard. This, of course, does not in
itself constitute a simple rejection of the role of civic en-
gagement in Qatari society. Our sample size is fairly small
and we have included many variables, making it difficult
for weak impacts to reach conventional levels of signifi-
cance. There are signs of positive effects in both tables in
this regard and further analysis shows, as noted above,
that charitable giving does enhance the Qatari accep-
tance of Arabs (57% of givers compared to 50% of non-
givers being happy to see Arabs as neighbours, p. 0.026).
As discussed above, trust is viewed inmuch of the so-
cial capital scholarship as a vital ingredient of social inter-
action that generates mutual benefits (Coleman, 1988;
Field, 2008; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; Woolcock,
1998). With regards to attitudes towards immigrants,
previous studies have shown that nationals with higher
levels of trust—variously defined as generalized trust, so-
cial trust, or personal trust—tend to hold positive atti-
tudes towards immigrants. These findings are supported
by our results with both Arab and Western expatriate
families. Trust in both groups has a strong predictive
power. Overall, Qataris exhibit different levels of trust to-
wards the different subgroups that comprise the expatri-
ate population in Qatar. Though this level of trust has in-
creased significantly between the two waves, it is much
higher for Arabs than for Westerners although the rate
of increase is higher for the latter. On the 0 to 10-point
scale, Qataris’ trust of Arabs increased from 6.18 in 2011
to 6.66 in 2015 while trust of Westerners increased from
3.57 in 2011 to 4.63 in 2015.
Regarding the importance Qataris attach to out-
groups adopting Qatari customs as a requirement for
obtaining citizenship, Qatari nationals seem to be more
flexible with Western families. The variable is significant
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only for Arab families. Qataris who have a strong de-
sire for people seeking citizenship of Qatar to adopt
Qatari customs are here shown to favour Arab families
as next-door neighbours but are rather neutral with re-
gard to Westerners.
Neighbourhood belonging, as an indicator of local
embeddedness or meso-level/situational social capital
(Li et al., 2005) is also believed to foster feelings of tol-
erance and acceptance. Those who perceive their neigh-
bourhoods as cohesive oneswhere people trust and help
one another are also seen as being more open to West-
erners. In our data, those with a strong sense of neigh-
bourhood belonging show a strong preference for having
Arabs and Westerners as next-door neighbours: around
10 percentage points more in both cases. In addition,
those residing in cohesive neighbourhoods are, other
things being equal, more willing by 11 percentage points
to have Westerners as next-door neighbours.
5. Conclusion
While numerous studies have been conducted on the
impacts of immigration upon local communities and so-
cial cohesion in receiving countries in western developed
countries such as the USA and Europe, little research
is available on the preferences of nationals in countries
where immigrants outnumber the mainstream popula-
tion. In this paper, we have carried out what we be-
lieve is the first systematic study on Qatari nationals’
preferences for accepting Arab and Western expatriate
families as their next-door neighbours. We use prefer-
ences for next-door neighbours as an indicator of tol-
erance and openness in a highly religious, conservative
social context. Drawing on data from nationally repre-
sentative samples and using a whole range of socio-
demographic and cultural variables—including civic en-
gagement, bridging and bonding social ties, as well as
social trust—as explanatory variables, we have obtained
some important findings. Our main results can be sum-
marized as follows:
• Whilst at the bivariate level most socio-demo-
graphic attributes are significantly associated with
Qataris’ preferences for accepting Arabs andWest-
erners as next-door neighbours, net effects show
that demographic-economic and educational dif-
ferences do not have salient effects.
• Despite the fact that Qataris are predominantly
Muslims, religiosity or practice per se do not have
marked effects on Westerner acceptance, though
it is weakly significant for accepting Arabs; rather,
it is social trust that plays a significant role.
• Bonding social ties tend to be negative, but bridg-
ing social ties, in terms of diversity of friends, neigh-
bourhood belonging, and perceived neighbour-
hood cohesion, are shown to engender greater tol-
erance and willingness to welcome out-groups.
Overall, while not negating the importance of socio-
economic factors, we find that trust and socially
engagement—in terms of diversity of friendship net-
works and active participation in neighbourhood affairs,
which tend to result in a higher sense of belonging
and cohesion—are seeds for tolerance, acceptance, and
accommodation.
The implications of our research aremanifold andwe
list three here. Firstly, as readers will know, social capital
research reached its heights in the early 2000s, after Put-
nam’s (2000) book on Bowling Alone (see Field, 2008, p.
3; Halpern, 2005, p. 9). Academic enthusiasm in this re-
spect seems to have substantially waned in recent years.
Scholars’ interest may ebb and flow but the underlying
social problems persist, as social capital in the form of
trust and bridging ties show significant net effects even in
a society where nationals comprise a relatively small pro-
portion of the population such as Qatar. Seen from this
perspective, we believe that our analysis has rendered
a positive service, if not in reinstating the importance of
social capital research, but at least in demonstrating the
continued relevance of the concept of social capital in so-
cial life.
Secondly, as noted in earlier discussions, political sci-
entists and sociologists seem to have travelled on sepa-
rate tracks, with the former beingmore interested in doc-
umenting the rise and fall of the national stock of social
capital and the relationship with democratic governance,
and the latter keener to interrogate the socio-economic
determinants of the differential possession of social cap-
ital. In the present study, we have managed to link both
traditions in a simultaneous way in our comprehensive
analysis of the socio-economic-cultural determinants of
preferences for accepting out-groups in a fairly intimate
way, as next-door neighbours. We have also conducted
our analysis at both individual and meso-levels.
Thirdly, in terms of policy implications, we believe
that our results on the positive effects of neighbourhood
belonging and cohesion on Qatari nationals’ acceptance
of out-groups could be useful for authorities interested in
making the country more welcoming and more inclusive.
While it would be difficult to increase people’s level of
trust (Li et al., 2005; Uslaner, 2008), it might be more fea-
sible to enhance community cohesion at the neighbour-
hood level.
Overall, while we have shown that social capital does
have a significant role to play in enhancing social inclu-
sion in amulti-ethnic andmulti-cultural context, wewish
to point out that there are many other aspects on which,
due to limited space, we have not been able to report.
These include findings related to policies on immigrants
and their subsequent impact, such as immigrants’ so-
journer mentality and an associated (un)willingness to
interact with nationals. These and other factors could im-
pact on one another, making it more challenging for re-
searchers and for policy-makers alike. We hope to report
more findings in due course.
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